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INTRODUCTION 
 While shopping with her stepmom at Walmart, 24-year-old Anastasia 
saw defendant Steven Norman Powell, who was wheelchair-bound, with the 
crotch of his pants cut out or pulled down and his genitals exposed; only a 
very see-through netting was placed over them. Anastasia got her stepmom 
and she saw the same thing. About a month later during “Black Friday” 
shopping, Anastasia and her stepmom were at Shopko and Anastasia again 
saw Powell with his genitals exposed, as before. She got her stepmom, and 
she too saw Powell with his genitals exposed and tried to snap a photo of him 
as evidence. But Powell saw her and covered his crotch with the leg of a pair 
of slacks hanging on a rack just before she snapped the picture.  
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 The stepmom filed a complaint a day after the Shopko incident, but it 
was not investigated until some nine months later. The detective on the case 
learned that Walmart had recorded over its surveillance footage, but he was 
able to view relevant surveillance footage from Shopko. The video confirmed 
that Powell was at the Shopko on Black Friday, showing him enter and exit 
the store. The detective was also able to somewhat track Powell’s movements 
in the store—camera coverage was not complete—but he saw no footage 
showing Powell with his genitals exposed. The detective took a screenshot 
picture of Powell in the store and another of his van in the parking lot as 
evidence he was there.  
 The detective later interviewed Powell at his home. Powell admitted 
that he had been to the Walmart and Shopko and when asked why he 
exposed himself, Powell explained that he did it for the thrill of it. He said 
that he had resorted to this behavior after he was paralyzed from the waist 
down in an accident at age 27.  
 Powell claims on appeal that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in representing him, but he has not hurdled the high bar required 
for such a claim. He claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
dismiss the case on due process grounds, arguing that the State failed to 
preserve the video evidence. But the State never possessed the Walmart 
-3- 
surveillance—it had already been recorded over before the detective could 
see it—and the detective only collected the screenshots from the Shopko 
video. Moreover, the record does not support Powell’s claim that the Shopko 
video was lost or destroyed. In light of controlling caselaw, reasonable 
counsel could conclude that a motion to dismiss would fail. And among the 
reasons it would fail is that the video would show no more than what the 
State admitted—the video did not show Powell with his genitals exposed. 
 Powell also claims that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
elements instructions for lewdness. But again, reasonable counsel could 
conclude that the elements instructions accurately set forth the law, i.e., 
lewdness does not involve an attempt, the relevant mental state for lewdness 
includes recklessness, and caselaw defining “any other act of lewdness” did 
not apply in this case because Powell’s charges rested on evidence that he 
exposed his genitals. 
 Powell also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion 
for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence. But where Anastasia and 
her mother testified that they saw Powell with his genitals exposed in 
Walmart and Shopko, and Powell admitted to the detective that he was at the 
stores on the nights in question and exposed himself for the thrill of it, the 
evidence was more than sufficient to submit the case to the jury. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for (a) not moving to 
dismiss the case on the ground that Powell’s due process rights were violated 
by the police department’s alleged failure to preserve surveillance video, and 
(b) not objecting to the elements instructions on lewdness?1 
 Standard of Review. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised 
for the first time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 
89 P.3d 162. That said, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance [is] highly 
deferential,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), and this Court 
will not reverse for ineffective assistance unless “no competent attorney” 
would have proceeded as counsel did in this case and it prejudiced the 
defense, see Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). 
 2. Was the evidence sufficient to support Powell’s convictions for 
lewdness? 
 Standard of Review. A trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed 
verdict is reviewed for correctness. State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶21, 345 P.3d 
                                              
1 Powell addresses his two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) 
claims in two points. He addresses his IAC claim related to the alleged due 
process violation in point III of his brief, see Aplt.Br. 35-50, but the State 
addresses it in point I.A of its brief. He addresses his IAC claim related to the 
elements instructions in point I of his brief, Aplt.Br. 5-20, but the State 
addresses it in point I.B of its brief.  
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1168. But in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the 
evidence “in the light most favorable to the State” and must uphold the denial 
of a directed verdict motion so long as “some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶27 (cleaned up). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
 Twenty-four-year-old Anastasia and her stepmom had two separate 
encounters with Powell, who was wheelchair bound, in which he exposed his 
genitals. R393,396-99. 
1. Powell exposes himself at Walmart. 
 On a weekend evening in October 2014, Anastasia, together with her 
stepmom, aunt, and some of her stepmom’s coworkers, interrupted their craft 
night with a snack run at Walmart. R393-96,413, 429-30,444-45. After arriving 
at the store, Anastasia split off from the group to make her way toward the 
cosmetics section. R395,430.  
 As Anastasia walked down the main aisle toward the cosmetics 
section, she saw Powell, with his penis exposed, emerge from the women’s 
clothing section and into the main aisle where she was walking. R395-99. She 
was less than five feet from him. R414. And Powell did “not just [have] his 
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zipper down, but, like, full-on nothing [was] covering down there”—only 
some kind of “like fishnet stockings that you wear for maybe a costume” that 
is [v]ery see-through.” R396. It was almost as if he owned “a pair of pants 
with nothing” in the crotch area, “like [it had been] cut out,” because it was 
“more than just [the] zipper being down that [she] could see.” R398.  
 Anastasia left the area to find her stepmom and aunt, told them that 
“this guy just flashed” her, and led them back to Powell to verify what she 
had just witnessed. R399,414-17,431. When they returned, Powell had just left 
women’s clothing and was in the jewelry section. R399,416. He did not appear 
to be shopping for anything and his genitals were still exposed. R399-400. 
Anastasia’s stepmom looked at Powell for 30-40 seconds and saw the same 
thing Anastasia had—Powell had “jeans on and the crotch was cut out with 
some black mesh, and [she] saw his penis.” R432-33,445-47.  
 The women reported what they had seen to Walmart personnel, who 
escorted Powell from the store. R400-01,417,434,447. Walmart did not report 
the incident to the police. R482. 
2. One month later, Powell exposes himself at Shopko. 
 The following month on Thanksgiving night, Anastasia went to 
Shopko for Black Friday shopping with her two younger brothers and her 
stepmom, who met them there. R402,405,418,427. Anastasia encountered 
-7- 
Powell again with his genitals exposed as before. R403-04,419. She saw him 
in the children’s clothing section and was about 20 feet from Powell. R403-
04,419. He was “wearing the same” jeans with nothing covering his crotch 
and she clearly saw his genitals. R404,419. It felt “creepy.” R421,424.  
 Anastasia found her stepmom, told her that Powell was in the store, 
and was exposing himself. R405,435.2 Both women couldn’t believe this was 
“happening again.” R405,435-36. Hoping to take a picture of Powell in the 
act, Anastasia’s stepmom got her smartphone and found Powell, still 
exposed, in the men’s clothing section adjacent to children’s clothing. 
R405,419-20,436. When the stepmom initially walked near him, she could not 
get a clear picture, so she walked past and then returned and took a picture. 
R437-38,441. But Powell saw her with smartphone in hand and just before she 
snapped the picture, he grabbed the leg of a pair of slacks hanging on a rack 
and placed it over his genitals. R407-10,420-21,438-40; SE1 (photo taken by 
stepmom).  
 The women left and notified Shopko personnel, but were subsequently 
told that he was seen leaving the store. R421,441-42. Shopko filed no report 
                                              
2 The testimony on this point varies, with Anastasia testifying that she 
alerted her stepmom, R405, and the stepmom testifying that it was 
Anastasia’s brother who alerted her, R435. 
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with the police. R482. But the next day, Anastasia’s stepmom and aunt 
reported what they had seen on the West Valley City Police Department’s 
Facebook website. R422,447-48. 
 Neither Anastasia nor her stepmom saw anything out of the ordinary, 
in either incident, related to Powell’s penis—there was no tubing, medical 
devices, or anything else unusual on or around his penis. R405,424-
25,433,450,455.  
3. Police investigate the complaint and Powell admits to the 
conduct. 
 Some nine months later, Detective Jason Vincent from the West Valley 
City Police Department began investigating the Facebook complaint. R422-
23,448,457,468. After getting written statements from both women, he 
checked with Walmart and Shopko to determine whether they had 
surveillance video of the two incidents. R457-58,469-70. Det. Vincent learned 
that Walmart only keeps surveillance footage for about 30 days and had 
already recorded over it. R458,470. But Shopko still had surveillance video 
from Thanksgiving that he was allowed to review. R458.  
 In watching the video, Det. Vincent saw a man in a wheelchair—whom 
he subsequently identified as Powell—enter and later exit Shopko, and he 
was able to partially track his movements in the store (the surveillance 
cameras do not provide full coverage of the entire store). R460,471-72,478-79. 
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In tracking Powell’s movements, he “never found any footage of him 
exposing himself,” despite the ability to zoom in on images. R472. Det. 
Vincent did not see either complainant in the video, but was focusing on 
Powell. R483. Det. Vincent captured two screen shots that demonstrated no 
more than the fact that Powell was at the Shopko on Thanksgiving night—
one showing his face and upper body in a clothing aisle and the other 
showing a van. R458-59; SE2-3.  
 Det. Vincent and another officer conducted a knock-and-talk at 
Powell’s residence. R460. Det. Vincent explained why he was there and asked 
Powell if they could look through his cell phone and computer. R461. Powell 
consented and while the assisting officer looked through the two electronic 
devices, Det. Vincent questioned Powell about the reports. See R461,480.3 
That officer “did not locate anything criminal” on either Powell’s cell phone 
or computer. R475. The two officers also looked around the house but did not 
find any pants with mesh over the crotch area or anything else that was 
incriminating. R475-76,480. 
                                              
3 West Valley City equips officers with a body cam, but because Det. 
Vincent is also on loan with Homeland Security, which does not permit body 
cams, he was not wearing a body cam when he interviewed Powell at his 
residence. R473-74,479. 
-10- 
 Det. Vincent asked Powell if he was at Walmart and Shopko and he 
confirmed that he was. R462. When Det. Vincent asked why he was exposing 
himself, Powell explained that when he was 27 years old, he became 
paralyzed from the waist down following a car accident. R461-62. He said 
that before the accident, he was a “thrill seeker” and participated in 
dangerous activities or sports. R461-62. He explained that since that time, 
exposing himself was “one of the things that he did to create excitement in 
his life”—“for the thrill of it.” R462. He admitted that when he did it, he wore 
a see-through mesh material. R463. He also admitted that this was not an 
isolated incident. R467. He was initially coy about how often he went into the 
community exposing himself, but ultimately admitted that he did so two or 
three times a month. R464.  
 In his written statement, Powell largely confirmed what he told Det. 
Vincent—admitting that he began resorting to lewd behavior for the adrena-
line rush. R466; SE4A-B. But in that statement, he added for the first time that 
his condom catheter became kinked while at the Shopko on Thanksgiving 
night and he tried to unkink it so he wouldn’t wet his pants. R467,476-77,481-
82. He stated, however, that he did not believe anyone saw him doing so, but 
said he could be wrong. R467,476-77; SE4A-4B. He also stated that he’s been 
confronted about it before and feels bad for doing it. R467-68; SE4A-4B.  
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B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 Powell was charged with two counts of lewdness, enhanced to third 
degree felonies for two prior lewdness convictions, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-702(2)(b) (Westlaw, 2014). R1-4,121-23. At the close of the State’s 
case in a one-day, bifurcated trial, the defense moved for a directed verdict, 
arguing that because the two witnesses’ testimony was not corroborated by 
any additional information, the evidence was insufficient to submit the case 
to the jury. R491-92. The court denied the motion. R492.  
 The jury found Powell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both 
lewdness counts and the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell 
was guilty of the enhancements. R176-78,532-34.4 After submission of a 
presentence investigation report, the district court sentenced Powell to two 
concurrent prison terms of up to five years. R220-21.  
 Powell timely appealed. R223-24,230. And in connection with his 
appeal, Powell filed a rule 23B remand motion for findings supporting a 
claim that counsel was ineffective (1) by improperly advising him regarding 
his right not to testify at trial, and (2) by not filing a motion to suppress his 
                                              
4 This was a second trial. The first resulted in a mistrial before 
testimony was taken, when one of the jurors disclosed a bias she had not 
made known during voir dire. R297-301. 
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statements to Det. Vincent on the ground that the detective did not advise 
him of his Miranda rights. See Rule 23B Motion to Remand.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Powell claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss 
the case on due process grounds, arguing that the State failed to preserve the 
surveillance video. But the State never possessed the Walmart surveillance 
video—it had already been recorded over before the detective could see it—
and the detective only collected the screenshots from the Shopko video. 
Moreover, the record does not support Powell’s claim that the Shopko video 
was lost or destroyed. In light of controlling caselaw, reasonable counsel 
could conclude that a motion to dismiss would fail. And among the reasons 
it would fail is that the video would show no more than what the State 
admitted—the video did not show Powell with his genitals exposed. 
 Powell also claims that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
elements instructions for lewdness. But again, reasonable counsel could 
conclude that the elements instructions accurately set forth the law, i.e., 
lewdness does not involve an attempt, the relevant mental state for lewdness 
includes recklessness, and caselaw defining “any other act of lewdness” did 
not apply in this case because Powell’s charges rested on evidence that he 
exposed his genitals. 
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 Powell also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion 
for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence. But where Anastasia and 
her mother testified that they saw Powell with his genitals exposed in 
Walmart and Shopko, and Powell admitted to the detective that he was at the 
stores on the nights in question and exposed himself for the thrill of it, the 





Powell’s trial counsel was not ineffective for not 
moving to dismiss the case on due process grounds and 
for not objecting to the elements instructions on 
lewdness. 
 Powell claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 
two reasons. He contends that counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
dismiss the case on due process grounds for the alleged failure of the police 
department to preserve exculpatory evidence, to wit, surveillance videos 
from both Walmart and Shopko. Aplt.Br. 35-50 (point III). And he argues that 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the elements instructions on 
lewdness. Aplt.Br. 5-20 (point I).  
 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must make the two-part showing established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984). He must prove that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient,” 
and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. 
Because a defendant must make “both showings,” a failure to prove either 
Strickland element is fatal to an ineffective-assistance claim. Id. The bar for 
proving ineffective assistance is high and “never an easy task.” Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). Powell has not overcome that high bar. 
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A. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to dismiss the 
case on due process grounds. 
 Powell claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
dismiss the case on due process grounds based on the police department’s 
alleged failure to preserve video surveillance from Walmart and Shopko. 
Aplt.Br. 35-50. As noted, Powell “must show both that counsel’s performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there exists a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Powell’s ineffective-assistance claim fails for three 
reasons. First, his claim is not, at least in part, supported by the record. 
Second, Powell does not argue, let alone prove, that counsel’s performance 
was both deficient and prejudicial. And third, counsel could not prove either 
deficient performance or prejudice.  
1. The record does not support Powell’s contention that the 
Shopko surveillance video was not available to trial 
counsel. 
 Powell’s ineffective-assistance claim fails at the outset because it is 
based, at least in part, on alleged facts not supported by the record. 
 The law is settled that “a defendant cannot bring an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on appeal without pointing to specific instances 
in the record demonstrating both counsel’s deficient performance and the 
-16- 
prejudice it caused defendant.” State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ¶16 (emphasis 
added). Powell’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
dismiss rests, in part, on the premise that the State seized the Shopko 
surveillance video, never made it available to trial counsel, and then lost or 
destroyed it. But none of those alleged facts appear in the record. 
 Powell claims that Det. Vincent “lost or destroyed [the video] after 
viewing the footage.” Aplt.Br. 42,46-47 (cleaned up). But he does not cite to 
anything in the record supporting that proposition. Det. Vincent testified that 
Shopko pulled the surveillance video for him, that he reviewed it, and that 
he took some screenshots showing Powell in the store and Powell’s van 
outside the store. R458-59; SE2-3. But there is nothing in the record suggesting 
that Det. Vincent kept the video, that it was not available for trial counsel’s 
review at Shopko, or if the detective kept the video, that he lost or destroyed 
it, or that the prosecution did not make it available to trial counsel.  
 In sum, the record does not support the allegations made in the brief 
related to the Shopko video. Consequently, Powell’s ineffective-assistance 
claim related to the Shopko video fails at the outset. 
2. Powell fails to argue, let alone prove, both deficient 
performance and prejudice. 
 In any event, Powell’s ineffective-assistance argument on appeal is 
fatally lacking.  
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 As noted, Powell must show both deficient performance and prejudice 
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. But because “defense counsel’s 
failure to litigate a [due process] claim is the principle allegation” of Powell’s 
claim of ineffectiveness,” he bears an additional burden: he “must also prove 
that his … claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that 
the verdict would have been different” as a result. Id. (emphasis added). 
 Thus, in addition to proving deficient performance and prejudice, 
Powell must prove that any such motion would have succeeded. If he cannot 
do that, his ineffectiveness claim is a nonstarter. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 
41, ¶26, 1 P.3d 546. On the other hand, proving that he would have succeeded 
on the motion is not nearly enough to prevail on his ineffectiveness claim—it 
is only a beginning. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, a concession that 
a particular motion would have succeeded “is not the same as a concession that 
no competent attorney would think a motion … would have failed, which is the 
relevant question under Strickland.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011) 
(emphasis added).  
 In his brief, Powell does no more than argue that a motion to dismiss 
on due process grounds would have succeeded. Relying on the due process 
analysis set forth in State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, 395 P.3d 111, Powell contends 
that (1) there is a reasonable probability the surveillance videos would have 
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been exculpatory, Aplt.Br. 38-41, and (2) dismissal was merited because 
(a) the police department had a duty to collect and preserve the evidence, 
Aplt.Br. 41-44, and (b) its failure to do so resulted in prejudice inasmuch as 
the surveillance footage “would have been a complete and continuously 
filmed recording of [him] while he was in the store,” Aplt.Br. 45-50. This is 
the sum and substance of Powell’s ineffective-assistance argument.  
 Powell’s ineffective-assistance claim is lacking. Indeed, the Court can, 
for the sake of argument, assume that a motion to dismiss “would have 
succeeded,” Premo, 562 U.S. at 124, just as Powell argues in his brief, Aplt.Br. 
35-50. But “that is not the same as [demonstrating] that no competent attorney 
would think a motion to [dismiss] would have failed, which is the relevant 
question under Strickland.” Id. Even though “a meritorious [due process] 
issue is necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment claim like [Powell’s], 
a good [due process] claim alone will not earn” him relief on appeal. 
Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382. Powell must still “prove under Strickland that [he 
has] been denied a fair trial by the gross incompetence of [his] attorneys.” Id.  
 Because Powell does no more than argue that a motion to dismiss on 
due process grounds would have succeeded, he has not surmounted the 
“highly demanding” burden of proving ineffective assistance. See id. He has 
not argued, let alone proven, that his counsel was deficient for not moving to 
-19- 
dismiss on due process grounds. Again, that is so even assuming arguendo 
the motion would have succeeded—Powell must also demonstrate that “no 
competent attorney would think a motion to [dismiss] would have failed.” 
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. He has not argued, let alone proven, that not filing the 
motion resulted in prejudice. In the context of Strickland, that means that had 
he filed a motion, there is a “substantial” likelihood of a different result at 
trial. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-12 (2011). For these reasons, Powell 
has not overcome the high bar for proving ineffective assistance and the 
Court should reject his claim. 
3. Powell could not prove that all competent counsel would 
believe that a motion to dismiss would succeed. 
 In any event, Powell could not meet Strickland’s high bar because 
reasonable counsel could conclude that any motion to dismiss would fail (and 
incidentally, it would have). Applying its holding in State v. Tiedemann, 2007 
UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, the Utah Supreme Court in DeJesus recognized a “two-
step analysis” in assessing whether a defendant’s due process rights are 
violated when the State loses or destroys evidence in its possession, and if so, 
the appropriate sanction. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶27. First, the defendant must 
make a “threshold” showing that the State violated due process by 
“demonstrating a reasonable probability that the lost evidence would have 
been exculpatory.” Id. Second, if the defendant makes that threshold 
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showing, the court then “must balance the culpability of the State and the 
prejudice to the defendant in order to gauge the seriousness of the due 
process violation and to determine an appropriate remedy.” Id.  
 But caselaw governing the State’s due process obligation to preserve 
evidence extends only to evidence it possesses: “It is a matter of clear Utah 
law that criminal defendants are entitled to information possessed by the State 
to aid in their defense.” State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶40, 162 P.3d 1106 
(emphasis added).  
 Reasonable counsel could thus conclude that the due process 
requirements identified in Tiedemann and DeJesus did not apply here because 
the State never possessed the video footage. Det. Vincent never even saw 
video footage from Walmart because by the time the case came across his 
desk, Walmart had recorded over it. R458,470. And although Det. Vincent 
testified that Shopko pulled surveillance video for him to review, R458, the 
record does not show that he seized the recording. He testified that he 
“collected some of that,” to wit, the photo showing Powell in the store (SE2) 
and the photo of Powell’s van (SE3). See R458-59. Det. Vincent’s video review 
was akin to police investigating a crime scene in search of physical 
evidence—detectives will collect evidence they conclude is relevant and leave 
the rest behind. In this case, Det. Vincent confirmed that the surveillance 
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video never captured Powell with his genitals exposed. R472. As a result, he 
captured screen shots establishing Powell’s presence in the store that night—
nothing more.  
 In arguing a due process violation, Powell makes broad and far-
reaching claims that the stores themselves have an “independent duty … to 
maintain the video” and that law enforcement has a duty to conduct “some 
minimal police investigation to preserve potential evidence for future use,” 
including “an initial quick inquiry” so that video evidence will be preserved. 
Aplt.Br. 43-44. Powell contends that the police in this case “additionally bear 
the burden for not having an immediate screening or filtering process in how 
and when they respond to a citizen’s online report of a crime.” Aplt.Br. 44. 
But Powell cites no case law supporting these broad propositions and the 
State can find none.  
 A similar argument was made more than three decades ago: “The 
defendant urges this Court to recognize a duty of the prosecution to gather 
all relevant evidence regardless of its impact on the success of the 
prosecution.” State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Utah 1986). And the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected it, holding that “[a]lthough the prosecution and 
investigators should preserve all incriminating and exculpatory evidence 
material to a case, the prosecution is not required to search for exculpatory 
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evidence, conduct tests, or exhaustively pursue every angle on a case.” Id. 
(cleaned up) (emphasis added); accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶50, 979 
P.2d 799 (quoting Shaffer). The Court explained that “imposing a duty on the 
prosecution to search for all relevant evidence … would require Herculean 
efforts by the prosecution. Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1306. And imposing such a duty 
“before a suspect has been identified and before the State is notified of 
possible defenses, is to require the impossible.” Id.  
 In sum, given the facts of the case and the controlling caselaw, 
reasonable counsel could conclude that a motion to dismiss would fail 
because the police never possessed the surveillance videos. 
 Reasonable counsel could also conclude that there was not a reasonable 
probability that the video would have been exculpatory—even if the State 
had possessed and lost it. In DeJesus, the Utah Supreme Court held that “in 
order to satisfy the reasonable probability standard in the lost evidence 
context, “a defendant must make some proffer as to the lost evidence and its 
claimed benefit.” 2017 UT 22, ¶39. And the court held that “[s]o long as the 
lost evidence and its claimed benefit is not pure speculation or wholly 
incredible, the standard will be satisfied.” Id. But Powell’s proffer here is pure 
speculation.  
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 Without record support, Powell claims that Walmart and Shopko have 
“security surveillance systems in place from above and at multiple angles 
from within the store” that “would have captured his exposed state at one 
angle or another for at least a second or more.” Aplt.Br. 38-39. But the only 
testimony on the coverage of the surveillance cameras came from the officer, 
who testified that “Shopko only has a specific amount of cameras” and thus 
a person moving around the store would not always be in the camera’s view. 
R478. Powell proffered no evidence—from store personnel or anyone else—
that the cameras would have captured him where the two women said he 
exposed himself. Powell claims that the screenshot from the Shopko video 
(SE2) shows him in the same clothing section that Anastasia and her stepmom 
saw him exposing himself (SE1), but again, there was no testimony to that 
fact and it is not apparent from a comparison of the photos. Again, Powell’s 
claim is pure speculation. 
 Powell nevertheless contends that there was a reasonable probability 
that the video would have provided exculpatory evidence because it “would 
have been a complete and continuously filmed recording of [him] while he 
was in the store.” Aplt.Br. 46. But even assuming for the sake of argument 
that were true, the Utah Supreme Court has held that such is insufficient to 
show a reasonable probability: “It is certainly true that a video recording of 
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the incident would have been highly probative of what truly happened. But 
simply stating that video recordings can be helpful to determine truth does 
not establish that this particular video recording would have been helpful to 
[defendant] in the specific circumstances of his case.” State v. Mohamud, 2017 
UT 23, ¶21, 395 P.3d 133. 
 Given this case law, reasonable counsel could again conclude that a 
motion to dismiss would have failed. 
 Additionally, reasonable counsel could conclude that dismissal would 
not result even if there were a reasonable probability that the video would 
have provided exculpatory information. DeJesus holds that in determining an 
appropriate sanction, courts must consider both the culpability of the State 
and the prejudice suffered. 2017 UT 22, ¶27. As noted, the caselaw suggests 
that the State bore no responsibility for collecting the evidence. Moreover, the 
State never claimed that the video would have corroborated its witnesses, as 
was the case in both Tiedemann and DeJesus. In fact, Det. Vincent testified that 
in tracking Powell’s movements, he “never found any footage of him 
exposing himself,” despite the ability to zoom in on images. R472. 
Accordingly, the video would have been no more probative than the 
detective’s testimony. Under these circumstances, reasonable counsel could 
conclude that a motion to dismiss would not have succeeded. 
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 In sum, given the relevant evidence in the case and governing caselaw, 
Powell has not demonstrated that “no competent attorney would think a 
motion to [dismiss] would have failed, which is the relevant question under 
Strickland.” Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. Nor has he demonstrated a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result had counsel filed a motion to dismiss. 
B. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the 
elements instructions on lewdness. 
 Powell also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
to the elements instructions on lewdness. Aplt.Br. 5-20. Those instructions 
required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements: 
1. STEVEN NORMAN POWELL;  
2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly performed any of the 
following acts: 
a. An act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
b. Exposed his genitals, buttocks, anus, or his pubic area; 
c. Masturbated; or  
d. Any other act of lewdness[;] 
3. And did so 
a. In a public place or 
b. Under circumstances which the defendant should have 
known would likely cause affront or alarm to another 14 
years of age or older. 
R198-99 (Inst. 18-19).  
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 Powell argues that the instruction incorrectly permitted a conviction 
for performing an act of lewdness “recklessly.” Aplt.Br. 10-15. His argument 
that lewdness does not involve reckless conduct rests on (1) the introductory 
“not amounting to” clause of the statute that includes an attempt to commit 
certain offenses, and (2) caselaw holding that an attempt requires intentional 
conduct. Aplt.Br. 10-11. He also relies on a policy argument based on a 
comparison of the lewdness statute with the lewdness involving a child 
statute. Aplt.Br. 12-15.  
 But Powell’s interpretation of the statute is a novel one and reasonable 
counsel could conclude that based on existing law, the instructions correctly 
identified the elements of the lewdness offense. First, the plain language of 
the statute supports the conclusion that “attempt” is not an element of the 
offense. The lewdness statute includes a “not amounting to” clause 
(italicized) and a “performance” clause (shaded): 
 A person is guilty of lewdness if the person under 
circumstances not amounting to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, 
forcible sexual abuse, aggravated sexual assault, sexual abuse of a 
minor, unlawful sexual conduct with a 16- or 17-year-old, custodial 
sexual relations or misconduct under Section 76-5-412 or 76-5-413, or 
an attempt to commit any of these offenses, performs any of the 
following acts in a public place or under circumstances which 
the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm to, on, 
or in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older: 
(a) an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
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(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of 
the areola, the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area; 
(c) masturbates; or 
(d) any other act of lewdness. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1) (Westlaw, 2019) (highlights and emphases 
added).5 
 The statute thus provides that a person is guilty of lewdness if, “under 
circumstances not amounting to” a designated offense “or an attempt to commit 
any of these offenses” (not-amounting-to clause), the person “performs” any 
number of specified acts (performance clause). Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, under a plain reading of the statute, the 
attempt language is tied to the “not amounting to” clause, not the ensuing 
performance clause.  
 Moreover, cases interpreting similar “not amounting to” language 
have uniformly held that such clauses do not constitute an element of the 
offense. See, e.g., State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 441, 443–46 (Utah App. 1996) 
(concluding that “under circumstances not amounting to rape, rape of a child 
or aggravated sexual assault” is not a “discrete element of the crime of 
incest”); State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶¶ 10–13, 100 P.3d 231 (analyzing 
                                              
5 The State cites the current version of the statute because amendments 
since the lewd conduct in this case do not affect the issues raised on appeal. 
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the language “not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation” in 
Utah’s internet enticement statute and concluding that the “clause does not 
require the State to affirmatively prove absence of attempt, conspiracy, and 
solicitation”); State v. Young, 2015 UT App 286, ¶10, 364 P.3d 55 (holding that 
“Utah cases have interpreted similar provisions of other criminal statutes and 
held that those provisions do not require the State to disprove the defendant’s 
commission of the act or acts the statutory language excludes”). 
 Based on the foregoing, counsel could reasonably conclude that 
attempt is not an element of lewdness. And counsel could reasonably 
conclude that because the performance prong of the lewdness statute is silent 
as to a mental state, the applicable mental state is, by statute, intentional, 
knowing, or recklessness: “when the definition of the offense does not specify 
a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (Westlaw, 2019).6  
 Powell also contends that the instruction was erroneous because, he 
argues, the statute requires that the victim of lewdness be 14 years of age or 
                                              
6 Accordingly, Powell’s claim that counsel was ineffective for not 
requesting a lesser included instruction for attempt is likewise unavailing. See 
Aplt.Br. 15-18. 
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older, whether the conduct occurs in a public place or under circumstances 
that would cause affront or alarm. Aplt.Br. 6-9. Again, Powell cites no caselaw 
supporting that interpretation. And reasonable counsel could conclude based 
on the plain language of the statute that the 14-or-older requirement does not 
apply to a lewd act performed in a public place. The statute prohibits lewd 
acts “in a public place or under circumstances which the person should know 
will likely cause affront or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is 
14 years of age or older.” It is reasonable to read the latter phrase as one—
“under circumstances which the person should know will likely cause affront 
or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older.”  
 In any event, reasonable counsel could also conclude that given the 
undisputed facts of the case, it did not matter whether the instruction 
correctly stated the law as to the age of the victim—the evidence was 
undisputed that the victims here were a 24-year-old woman and her mother. 
And for the same reason, there could be no prejudice. See State v. Garcia, 2017 
UT 53, ¶42, 424 P.3d 171 (“A proper [Strickland] analysis also needs to focus 
on the evidence before the jury and whether the jury could reasonably have 
found that [defendant] acted in imperfect self-defense such that a failure to 
instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdict.”). 
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 Finally, Powell contends that the instruction should have narrowly 
defined his act of lewdness as defined in State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, 322 P.3d 
719, which interpreted the lewdness-involving-a-child statute. Aplt.Br. 18-20. 
But that case interpreted the meaning of “any other act of lewdness,” which 
like the lewdness statute at issue here, follows a list of specifically-identified 
acts of lewdness. See Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, ¶¶11-12. As explained in Bagness, “[i]t 
is a catchall term at the end of an exemplary list” and “must be understood 
as similar in kind—involving an element of lasciviousness—to acts 
enumerated in the statute.” Id. at ¶¶18-19 (cleaned up). Counsel could 
reasonably conclude that an instructional definition of “any other act of 
lewdness” was not required because the State’s case did not rest on the 
catchall provision, but on the specifically-designated act of “exposing his or 
her genitals.”  
 In sum, Powell has fallen far short of demonstrating ineffective 
assistance of counsel. He has not demonstrated that “no competent attorney 
would think” the instructions accurately stated the law. Premo, 562 U.S. at 
124. And in fact, as shown, the instructions did accurately state the law. 
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II. 
The evidence was more than sufficient to support 
Powell’s convictions for lewdness. 
 Finally, Powell argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 
for a directed verdict. Aplt.Br. 20-34. In support, he points to cases that have 
addressed the sufficiency of evidence supporting a finding that a defendant 
took “indecent liberties” under the forcible sexual abuse statute, Aplt.Br. 22-
23, committed “any other act of lewdness” under the lewdness-involving-a 
child statute, Aplt.Br. 23-26, and committed a sexual activity with another 
person for a fee. Aplt.Br. 32-34. But Powell’s conviction rested on none of 
those statutory provisions or theories, but on the provision in the lewdness 
statute that expressly prohibits a person from intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly “expos[ing] his or her genitals.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1)(b). 
Accordingly, the only question on appeal is whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury finding that he did. 
 A defendant appealing the denial of a directed-verdict motion for 
insufficient evidence “must overcome a substantial burden on appeal to show 
that the trial court erred.” State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶21, 345 P.3d 1168. To 
begin with, the evidence adduced at trial—and all inferences that may fairly 
be drawn from that evidence—must be reviewed “in the light most 
favorable” to the jury verdict. State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29, 84 P.3d 1183. 
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Any “ ‘conflicts in the evidence’ ” must therefore be resolved “ ‘in favor of the 
jury verdict.’ ” State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶32, 392 P.3d 398 (quoting State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)). Moreover, the trial court’s denial of 
the directed-verdict motion “lends [even] further weight to the jury’s 
verdict.” State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶63, 52 P.3d 1201, abrogated on other grounds 
in Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, 388 P.3d 447; accord State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 
¶15, 210 P.3d 288. This is so because the judge “who presided over a trial is 
in a far better position than an appellate court to determine … whether the 
evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict.” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT 24, ¶22, 309 P.3d 201. 
 Neither this Court nor the trial court may adjudge the evidence 
insufficient so long as “ ‘some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’ ” Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶27 (quoting Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 
¶29). The evidence presented at trial here readily satisfies that standard. 
 Anastasia testified that as she walked down the main aisle in Walmart 
toward the cosmetics section, she saw Powell, with his penis exposed, emerge 
from the women’s clothing section and into the main aisle where she was 
walking. R395-99. She was less than five feet from him. R414. And she 
testified that Powell did “not just [have] his zipper down, but, like, full-on 
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nothing [was] covering down there”—only some kind of “like fishnet 
stockings that you wear for maybe a costume” that is [v]ery see-through.” 
R396. It was almost as if he owned “a pair of pants with nothing” in the crotch 
area, “like [it had been] cut out,” because it was “more than just [the] zipper 
being down that [she] could see.” R398. And Anastasia’s stepmom likewise 
testified that when she went to verify Anastasia’s account, she saw the same 
thing Anastasia saw—Powell had “jeans on and the crotch was cut out with 
some black mesh, and [she] saw his penis.” R432-33,445-47.  
 Anastasia testified that a month later while shopping at Shopko, she 
encountered Powell again with his genitals exposed as before. R403-04,419. 
She saw him in the children’s clothing section and was about 20 feet from 
Powell. R403-04,419. She testified that he was “wearing the same” jeans with 
nothing covering his crotch and she clearly saw his genitals. R404,419. And 
Anastasia’s stepmom testified that she thereafter found Powell in the men’s 
clothing section with his genitals exposed as before. R405,419-20,436. And she 
tried to take a picture with her smartphone, but just before she snapped the 
photo, Powell saw her with the camera and grabbed the leg of a pair of slacks 
hanging on a rack and placed it over his genitals. R407-10,420-21,437-41; SE1 
(photo taken by stepmom).  
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 But this was not all. Det. Vincent testified that when he interviewed 
Powell at his home, Powell confirmed that he was at Walmart and Shopko. 
R462. And when Det. Vincent asked why he exposed himself, Powell 
explained that it was “one of the things that he did to create excitement in his 
life” following an accident that left him paralyzed from the waist down. R461-
62. He also testified that Powell admitted that when he did it, he wore a see-
through mesh material. R463.  
 This evidence was more than sufficient to support the trial court’s 
denial of Powell’s motion for a directed verdict. It established that he was in 
a public place—Walmart and Shopko—and that his genitals were exposed to 
public view. Powell points to other evidence, or lack thereof, that did not 
support the finding, such as no surveillance video showing that he was 
exposed and the stepmom’s failure to take a picture showing that he was 
exposed. But any “conflicts in the evidence” do not justify a directed verdict 
because, when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the 
case to the jury or sufficient to support the jury verdict, conflicting evidence 
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must be resolved “in favor of the jury verdict.” Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶32 
(cleaned up).7 
 Powell also contends that the evidence of the requisite mental state was 
insufficient because he covered himself before Anastasia’s stepmom took a 
picture, and he had explained in his written statement that at Shopko, he was 
trying to undo a kink in his catheter. Aplt.Br. 27,31. While a lack of intent or 
knowledge may be one inference, the jury could reject that inference in favor 
of a different inference—supported by his own statement to Det. Vincent—
that he intentionally and knowingly exposed himself “for the thrill of it.” 
R462. And this Court is required to accept the latter inference. See Montoya, 
2004 UT 5, ¶29 (holding the evidence and all inferences fairly drawn from it 
must be reviewed “in the light most favorable” to the jury verdict).  
 Moreover, as noted, the evidence need only have established that 
Powell recklessly exposed himself. A jury could surely conclude that undoing 
his pants to adjust a condom catheter in a Shopko on a relatively busy 
                                              
7 Powell also points to allegations in his affidavit that Walmart security 
found no evidence of him exposing himself. Aplt.Br. 30-31. But this Court 
does not consider extra-record evidence on appeal and should strike it. See 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶52 n.6, 150 P.3d 480 (observing that court does 
not generally consider extra-record evidence on appeal). In any event, and as 
explained, such conflicting evidence would not form a basis for a directed 
verdict. See Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶32. 
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shopping day was reckless behavior. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) 
(Westlaw, 2019) (providing a person acts recklessly “when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or that the result will occur”). Thus, Powell’s claimed 
rationale for being exposed is hardly a defense to the charges. 
 In sum, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the lewdness 
charges and to submit the case to the jury.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm Powell’s 
convictions. 
 Respectfully submitted on June 11, 2019. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
 
/s/ Jeffrey S. Gray 
  JEFFREY S. GRAY 
  Assistant Solicitor General 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (Westlaw, 2019) (Lewdness)
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702 (Westlaw, 2019). Lewdness. 
 (1) A person is guilty of lewdness if the person under circumstances not 
amounting to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, forcible sexual abuse, aggravated 
sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, unlawful sexual conduct with a 16- or 17-
year-old, custodial sexual relations or misconduct under Section 76-5-412 or 76-5-
413, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, performs any of the following 
acts in a public place or under circumstances which the person should know will 
likely cause affront or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is 14 years of 
age or older: 
 (a) an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
 (b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, 
the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area; 
 (c) masturbates; or 
 (d) any other act of lewdness. 
 (2) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection 
(1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, except under Subsection (2)(b). 
 (b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if at the time of the violation: 
 (i) the person is a sex offender as defined in Section 77-27-21.7; 
 (ii) the person has been previously convicted two or more times of 
violating Subsection (1); or 
 (iii) the person has previously been convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (1) and has also previously been convicted of a violation of 
Section 76-9-702.5. 
 (c) (i) For purposes of this Subsection (2) and Subsection 77-41-102(17), a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge under this section that is held in abeyance 
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction. 
 (ii) This Subsection (2)(c) also applies if the charge under this Subsection 
(2) has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
 (3) A woman's breast feeding, including breast feeding in any location where 
the woman otherwise may rightfully be, does not under any circumstance constitute 





 State’s Exhibit 1 (witness’s photo of Powell in Shopko) 
 State’s Exhibit 2 (surveillance screenshot of Powell in Shopko) 
 State’s Exhibit 3 (surveillance screenshot of Powell’s van in 
Shopko parking lot) 
 
 



